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Abstract: Using two-period panel data from the Nippon Life Insurance Research 
Institute, this paper tests the hypothesis that an increase in the self-pay ratio of medical 
expenditures associated with the Japanese health insurance reforms of April 2003 
reduced household medical expenditures. We find that the increase in the self-pay ratio 
had a positive but insignificant effect on the share of medical expenses in household 
expenditure. However, when we employ the data as repeated cross-sectional 
observations to increase the sample size, the increase in the self-pay ratio has a 
significantly positive effect on the share of medical expenditures. This provides 
corroborating evidence that middle- and old-aged persons were unable to reduce their 
demand for medical services with the increase in the self-pay ratio. An additional 
finding is that medical services are a necessary good, particularly for those aged 61 
years or older and those with medical expenditures accounting for a relatively high 
share of medical expenditures in high household expenditure. 
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Introduction 
It is well known that Japan is one of the world’s fastest aging societies and the medical 
expenses associated with this process are rapidly increasing. According to the 2010 White 
Paper on the Aging Society, early-stage elderly people (persons aged 65–74 years) 
accounted for 17.3% of the Japanese population in 2000 and this had increased to 20.1% 
in 2005 and further to 23.1% in 2010.1 Concomitantly, the ratio of medical costs to GDP 
was 7.1% in 1998 rising to 8.1% in 2006.2
There are two types of universal health insurance schemes in Japan: an 
employees’ health insurance program and a national health insurance program. Regular 
employees are usually eligible to join an employees’ health insurance program (the 
program also covers their dependents), while others, including nonregular employees, the 
self-employed, the nonemployed, and the retired, have little choice but to join the national 
health insurance program. In 2003, the Health Insurance Act was revised in such a way 
that the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures for regular employees joining an 
employees’ health insurance program was increased, while the ratio for those joining the 
national health insurance program was unchanged (see Figure 1). To be more specific, the 
self-pay ratio of medical expenditures for both inpatient and outpatient treatment incurred 
by employees was raised from 20% to 30%. Members’ dependents incurred the increase 
 Preventing further escalation in medical costs, 
particularly for older persons requiring additional medical care, is a necessary and 
pressing policy challenge. The alternatives are the financial collapse of the current 
medical insurance system or the unprecedented burden of medical costs placed on the 
next generation, who will have to pay through increases in direct and/or indirect taxation. 
In response to this urgent policy concern, this paper estimates Engle curves for medical 
services in Japan and addresses the containment effects of the health insurance reforms 
that took effect in April 2003 on household medical demand and expenditures, 
particularly for middle- and old-aged persons as they generally require and spend more on 
additional medical care. We also consider heterogeneity in the effects of these reforms 
across different groups by medical expenditure and additionally consider whether 
medical services are a luxury or a necessary good from estimating Engle curves. 
                                                 
1 The data are from the Japanese Cabinet Office: http://www8.cao.go.jp/kourei/whitepaper/index-w.html 
2 OECD Health Data, 2002 and 2009. 
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only for inpatient treatment, as the rate for outpatient treatment was already at 30%. For 
those joining the national health insurance program, the self-pay ratio of medical 
expenditures for both forms of treatment was unchanged and remained at 30%. 
Many studies in the literature have addressed price effects in the demand for 
medical services. As early as 1971, the RAND Corporation and the US Department of 
Health and Human Services commenced a joint project (the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment) that designed and administered natural and randomized experiments in this 
area in the US. This project artificially produced exogenous variations in health-related 
policy by randomizing samples, thereby allowing health economists to examine the 
policy effects on the demand for medical services. These experiments suggested that the 
effect of the provision of health insurance on health-related spending was minor 
(Manning et al. 1987; Newhouse et al. 1993).3 Whereas the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment focused on partial-equilibrium analysis, Finkelstein (2007) estimated the 
general equilibrium effect of the introduction of Medicare on health spending for the 
elderly, suggesting that its impact was much larger than that obtained from the RAND 
experiment.4 A number of other studies also support the positive impact of Medicare 
eligibility on the use of health services (Card et al. 2008; Decker 2005;5
Importantly, despite the lack of suitable data, health economists in Japan have 
also undertaken research into effective policies designed to reduce medical expenditures. 
For instance, Yoshida and Takagi (2002) estimated the demand for medical services 
following the 1997 increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures from 10% to 
20% for household heads joining the employees’ health insurance program. Yoshida and 
Takagi (2002) concluded that these reforms had no effect on the demand for medical 
services. However, one limitation of their work was that the data were from only a single 
 Lichtenberg 
2002). 
                                                 
3 Zweifel and Manning (2000) and Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) comprehensively summarized a number 
of these experiments. 
4 Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) estimated that the introduction of Medicare induced the elderly to cut 
copayments for health services by 40% in the top quartile of the copayment distribution, and therefore that 
this had no impact on elderly mortality. 
5 Decker (2005) focused on the effect of Medicare on the demand for health services for treating breast 
cancer in women before and after 65 years of age. 
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company, implying that the sample was not random. To address this shortcoming, Kan 
and Suzuki (2006) obtained data on 11 insurance associations from the Japanese Ministry 
of Health, Labour, and Welfare and reestimated the effect of the 1997 health insurance 
reforms on the demand for medical services. In addition, they examined the policy effects 
on outpatient and inpatient treatment separately. 
In contrast to Yoshida and Takagi (2002), Kan and Suzuki (2006) found the price 
elasticity of demand for outpatient treatment was significantly negative in a range 
between –0.05 and –0.06. On this basis, the price elasticity for outpatient treatment 
exceeded elasticities estimated by Bhattacharya et al. (1996), also using Japanese data. 
However, the price elasticity of demand for inpatient treatment was insignificant. Later, 
Yoshida and Ito (2000) calculated the demand for outpatient treatment from the number 
of practice receipts and again considered the effect of the 1997 health insurance reforms. 
They found that a rise in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures did not affect demand 
for household heads but did for their dependents. In these circumstances, the increased 
burden of medical bills would fall on dependents rather than on household heads. 
Sawano (2000) estimated Engle curves for medical services to investigate the 
impact of the self-pay system on the demand for outpatient treatment for the elderly. 
Sawano (2000) concluded that medical services were a necessary good and also that a 
change in the price of elderly care did not affect the demand for elderly care. Yoshida and 
Kawamura (2009) also examined the elderly care system in a study of physician demand 
for outpatient treatments. Their finding was that dependents more often visited a 
physician because the copayment decreased for dependents under the elderly care system, 
while it remained almost the same for household heads. 
The first contribution of this paper is to examine the impact of the 2003 health 
insurance reforms on medical demand. The second is to focus attention on the demand for 
medical care among middle- and old-aged persons, as they usually require more medical 
care than other age groups and now make up a growing share of the Japanese population. 
We employ a two-period panel dataset on the consumption behavior of the middle-aged 
and older population conducted by the Nippon Life Insurance (NLI) Research Institute. 
The survey was administered first in December 2001 and again in December 2003, and 
thus spans the implementation date (April 2003) of the revised Health Insurance Act. 
The main findings are as follows. To start with, we find that the increase in the 
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self-pay ratio of medical expenditures had a positive but insignificant effect on the share 
of medical expenses in household expenditure. One possible reason for this result is that 
the standard error of the policy parameter is sufficiently large for small samples, thereby 
reducing the significance of the policy parameter. As an alternative approach, we then 
employ the data not as a balanced panel, but rather as repeated cross-sectional 
observations to increase the size of the sample. Here, we indeed find that the increase in 
the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures had a significantly positive effect on the share 
of medical expenditures, implying that the increase in copayments a patient has to pay 
exceeds the decrease in medical expenditures through a decrease in the quantity 
demanded for medical services. This supports the view that middle- and old-aged persons 
were unable to reduce their demand for medical services with an increase in the self-pay 
ratio. In addition, we find that medical services are a necessary good, particularly for 
those aged 61 years or older and those with a relatively high share of medical 
expenditures in household expenditure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by providing the 
conceptual framework. In the subsequent sections, we detail the data and empirical 
specifications, followed by the estimated results. The final section provides some 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
Conceptual framework 
This section develops a simple demand model to examine the effects of an increase in the 
self-pay ratio of medical expenditures on the demand for medical services. We employ 
the same methodology as Sawano (2000). Let p and D(p) respectively denote the price 
and demand for a medical service. An individual household pays τpD(τp) for the medical 
service, where τ represents the average household self-pay ratio of medical expenditure. 
An increase in τ then increases but simultaneously decreases the household expenditure 
of the medical service because of its decrease in the quantity demanded. Which particular 
effect dominates depends on the price elasticity of the demand curve. Taking the 
differential of τpD(τp) with respect to τ yields: 
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The last term indicates the price elasticity of medical service demand. If the demand 
curve is elastic, an increase in τ decreases the household expenditure for this medical 
service. On the other hand, if the demand curve is inelastic, household medical 
expenditure increases. If the elasticity equals one, these opposing effects cancel each 
other out, and the household medical expenditure remains unchanged, despite the 
increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures. Therefore, it is unclear whether an 
individual household bears relatively more of the burden of medical bills with the 
increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures (for both employees and their 
dependents) from 20% to 30%. 
How does the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures affect the 
total medical expenditure pD(τp), that is, the sum of out-of-pocket expenditures 
(τpD(τp)) and health care benefits ((1–τ)pD(τp)) incurred by the government? Without 
doubt, an increase in τ decreases the total medical expenditure if the price remains 
constant, and so how much the total medical expenditure decreases depends ultimately on 
the price elasticity of demand for medical services. If the demand curve is elastic, the total 
medical expenditure substantially decreases; in contrast, if the demand curve is inelastic, 
the amount of any decrease is small. 
We estimate Engle curves for medical services to test the effect of an increase in 
the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures on the demand for medical services. Because 
our two-period panel data straddle the implementation date of the Health Insurance Act, 
we can employ a difference-in-difference (DID) method, allowing for comparison of a 
treatment group and a control group. Households that have at least one employee who 
faces an increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures belong to the treatment 
group, while households in which a middle- or old-aged man and his spouse are either 
self-employed, nonemployed, or retired belong to the control group. Following Leser 
(1963), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and Sawano (2000), the econometric 
specification of the Engle curve follows a first-difference structure: 
,)log(43210 iiiiiii uEDTDXMS ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆ βββββ  
where MSi is the ratio of household medical expenditures to total household expenditure, 
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Ei is total expenditure per household member, Ti is a year dummy, Di is a dummy 
indicating to which group the individual belongs (i.e. the treatment or control group), and 
TiDi is the cross term of Ti and Di.  ∆TiDi indicates a policy variable and equal one if and 
only if a household has at least one employee joining an employees’ insurance program 
after the implementation date of the 2003 Health Insurance Act, irrespective of her or his 
insurance status before the date. Finally, Xi represents a vector of individual 
characteristics. 
We should note that not all households belong to the same group during both 
periods; that is, some employed individuals as of December 2001 had become 
self-employed or retired by December 2003, and vice versa. The coefficient β2 therefore 
captures the effect of changes in employment status of household members on household 
medical expenditures. The coefficient β3 is the one for the cross term indicating the policy 
effect of the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures on MS. Because we 
assume total household expenditure (the denominator of MS) is exogenous according to 
the static model of preference maximization, β3 also implies the effect of the increase in 
the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures on the household expenditure for medical 
services (the numerator of MS or τpD(τp)).6
There are two points to keep in mind when we use the DID method. First, it is 
possible that the policy change is endogenous, in the sense that many employees and their 
dependents faced with the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures were 
encouraged to visit a hospital, even for nonemergency care, before the revised Health 
 This policy measure allows us to distinguish 
the effect of the policy change from any other factors (such as macroeconomic shocks) 
that commonly affect every household. Finally, β4 indicates whether medical services are 
a luxury or a necessary good. If the estimated coefficient β4 is positive, we can consider 
medical services a luxury good, but if β4 is negative, medical services are a necessary 
good. 
                                                 
6 For simplicity, the problem of preference maximization is given by: max u(z1, z2) subject to τpz1+z2=I, 
where z1 is the demand for (consumption of) medical services, z2 is the bundle of other consumption goods 
with the price normalized to one, and I is exogenous total household expenditure. Therefore, the demand for 
medical services is derived implicitly by z1=D(τp, I). We assume that both τ and I are exogenous and 
independent of each other. For simplicity, I is omitted from the demand function for medical services. 
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Insurance Act took effect. This problem is not so serious because the survey was 
conducted in December 2001, long before the implementation date of the Health 
Insurance Act, even before this act was approved in the Diet in July 2002. We assume that 
as of December 2001, people did not anticipate this legislative change.   Second, we must 
assume that both the treatment and the control groups are homogeneous with respect to 
any unobservable factors. Otherwise, it is difficult to determine whether any difference in 
medical service demand between the two groups is attributable to the changing legislation 
or to the heterogeneity of the groups with respect to the other factors. To partly control for 
this, various household characteristics are included in the estimations. 
As we later explain, because we reconstitute balanced panel data to estimate 
first-difference equations, the sample size unfortunately becomes very small. The 
first-difference estimator is then less precise. To address this shortcoming, we would 
prefer to treat the data as repeated cross-sectional observations instead of balanced panel 
data in estimating the DID structure. This allows us to include unbalanced observations 
and therefore increase the sample size. However, we should be aware of a shortcoming in 
using repeated cross-section data. In sum, if the composition of the treatment and control 
groups is systematically different before and after the implementation of the reforms, the 
policy parameter is potentially biased. This is because any difference in the demand for 
medical services between the groups then results not only from the legislative change, but 
also from exogenous differences between the two groups with respect to unobserved 
factors. 
In addition, we consider the heterogeneous effects of the revised Health 
Insurance Act on the demand for medical services across different groups by medical 
expenditure using quantile regression methods. We expect that the adverse effect of this 
change is greater for those who spend relatively more of their household expenditure on 
medical services. Note again that we do not treat the data as a panel in estimating the 
quantile regression, but rather as repeated cross-sectional observations. This is beneficial 
for obtaining the sufficiently large size of samples, although there is the possibility that 
the treatment assignment is not random. 
 
 
Data 
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The data used in this study are a Japanese micro-level dataset, the Survey for Living and 
Life Design (kurashi to seikatusekkei nikannsuru chousa) conducted by the NLI Research 
Institute.7
We now explain our means of differentiating between the treatment and the 
control groups. To do this, it is necessary to identify the employment status of each 
individual respondent (men) and his spouse (women) because the increase in the self-pay 
ratio of medical expenditures applies only to those joining an employees’ health insurance 
program, as determined by employment status. Five types of employment status are 
possible for each individual respondent: 
 This survey was designed to reveal how middle- and old-aged persons (whose 
share of the population in Japan is rapidly growing) transition through life. This survey 
was conducted in December every second year from 1997 to 2003, and samples men born 
between 1933 and 1947 as per the area sampling method. In 1997, therefore, the 
respondents were aged between 50 and 64 years. The survey included 1,502 respondents 
in 1997, 1,034 in 1999, 910 in 2001, and 814 in 2003. As the purpose of the current study 
is to address whether the Health Insurance Act that took effect in April 2003 is effective in 
constraining medical expenses, we use the third (2001) and fourth (2003) surveys. 
 
(i) regular employees—those who self-reported that they worked as a regular 
employee; 
(ii) nonregular employees (1)—those who self-reported that they worked as a 
nonregular worker, and responded that they worked three-quarters of a regular 
employee’s weekly hours of work (30 hours a week) or more;8
(iii) nonregular employees (2)—those who self-reported that they worked as a 
nonregular worker, responded that they worked less than three-quarters of a 
regular employee’s weekly hours of work (30 hours a week), and earned an annual 
income of  JPY1.3 million or more if aged less than 60 years, or  JPY1.8 million or 
more if aged 60 years or older; 
 
                                                 
7 A member of the Nippon Life Insurance Company (NISSAY) group. 
8 When data on the weekly hours of work are missing, but those for the daily hours of work and monthly 
working days are available, we calculate the average weekly hours of work as the monthly working days 
divided by 4.3 times the daily hours of work. 
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(iv) nonregular employees (3)—those who self-reported that they worked as a 
nonregular worker, responded that they worked less than three-quarters of a 
regular employee’s weekly hours of work (30 hours a week), and earned an annual 
income of less than JPY1.3 million if aged less than 60 years, or less than JPY1.8 
million if aged 60 years or older; 
(v) self-employed—those who self-reported that they worked as a self-employed 
worker, including professionals; 
(vi) nonemployed—those who did not report that they worked, including the retired. 
 
We consider nonregular employees (1) as substantially regular employees, the difference 
being that while regular employees are eligible to receive generous welfare benefits in 
compensation for compliance of instruction in the course of employment, nonregular 
employees usually do not participate in a welfare program but can flexibly arrange 
workplace conditions and working hours. We should be aware that a nonregular 
employee (2) earns too much income to be a dependent of his spouse, even if she is a 
regular employee, and thus has to participate individually in the national health insurance 
program. In contrast, a nonregular employee (3) is still eligible to be a dependent of his 
spouse if she is a regular employee. 
Because the dataset does not include comparable information on the 
employment status of spouses (all female), we obtain this using their annual salary or 
income. Annual income includes salary, pension benefits (public and private), and 
dividends. We assume that a spouse is a regular employee signing up to her own 
employees’ health insurance program if her annual salary is over JPY2.74 million if she is 
aged 40–44 years, JPY2.81 million if aged 45–49 years, JPY2.90 million if aged 50–54 
years, JPY2.89 million if aged 55–59 years, JPY2.33 million if aged 60–64 years, and 
JPY2.23 million if she is 65 years or older. These figures represent the average annual 
salary for middle school graduates for each age range.9
                                                 
9 The data are from the 2002 Japanese Wage Census conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, 
and Welfare: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/itiran/roudou/chingin/kouzou/z02/index.html. 
 We employ them as lax threshold 
points to distinguish between regular and nonregular employees. Alternatively, we 
consider a spouse who earns an annual salary of less than the corresponding annual salary 
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as a nonregular employee in the national health insurance program. However, if a 
spouse’s annual income, inclusive of salary, pension benefits, and dividends, is less than 
JPY1.3 million (less than JPY1.8 million for those aged 60 years or older), and if her 
husband is a regular employee, she is eligible to be her husband’s dependent, and so is 
partially covered by his employees’ health insurance program. In this case, the spouse’s 
self-pay ratio of medical expenditures was 20% for inpatient treatment prior to the health 
insurance reforms. The drawback of this approach is that we cannot identify whether a 
spouse earning her own salary is employed or self-employed. 
Table 1 displays the cross-sectional matrix of the types of health insurance for 
each individual (male) respondent and his spouse (female). There are four groups based 
on the combination of insurance programs. Group 1 consists of households where both 
the respondent and his spouse are regular employees (or regular employees of substance), 
in which case both have incurred the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures 
for outpatient and inpatient treatment from 20% to 30%. Group 2 includes regular 
employees whose spouse is either nonemployed, a nonregular employee, or 
self-employed (an employer) with an annual income of less than JPY1.3 million (or less 
than JPY1.8 million for spouses aged 60 years or older). They then benefit from coverage 
of the employees’ health insurance program of which their partner is a member. Although 
the revision of the Health Insurance Act increased the self-pay ratio of medical 
expenditures for regular employees from 20% to 30% for both outpatient and inpatient 
treatment, it increased the self-pay ratio for their spouses from 20% to 30% only for 
inpatient treatment; the self-pay ratio for outpatient treatment remained at 30%. 
Group 3 includes regular employees whose spouse is either self-employed or a 
nonregular employee with an annual income of JPY1.3 million or more (or JPY1.8 
million or more for spouses aged 60 years or older). Neither this type of nonregular 
employee nor the employer is eligible to benefit from coverage of the employees’ health 
insurance program of which their partner is a member, and so they participate in the 
national health insurance program. Although the regular employee incurred increases in 
the burden of medical expenditures for inpatient and outpatient treatment, the burden for 
the spouse remained unchanged (at 30% for both treatments). Finally, Group 4 consists of 
households where both the respondent and his spouse are nonemployed, self-employed, 
or nonregular employees. Because both are in the national health insurance program, the 
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health insurance reforms had no adverse impact on their burden of medical expenditures. 
We contend that the revision of the Health Insurance Act increased the burden of medical 
expenditure to the greatest extent in Group 1, followed by Groups 2 and 3, and did not 
affect the burden of medical expenditure for Group 4. 
We consider three cases to distinguish between the treatment and control groups: 
<Treatment A>, Groups 1 and 2 as the treatment group and Groups 3 and 4 as the control 
group; <Treatment B>, Groups 1 to 3 as the treatment group and Group 4 as the control 
group; and <Treatment C>, individual respondents (men) who joined an employees’ 
health insurance program and those signing up for national health insurance.10
We remove households from our sample where a respondent is aged 70 years or 
older because their medical expenditures are determined under a different medical system 
for the elderly. In principle, the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures for those aged 70 
years or older remains at 10%, regardless of employment status. For example, a regular 
employee aged 68 years in 2001 became 70 years of age in 2003 and so automatically has 
a lower burden of medical expenditures in 2003 (10% according to Figure 1). 
 The first 
two treatments take account of the employment status of (female) spouses in grouping the 
treatment and control groups, while the last treatment omits the employment status of 
(female) spouses and defines the two groups only by the (male) individual’s insurance 
program (that is, employment status). 
We specify the ratio of household medical expenses to total household 
expenditure as the dependent variable. Using this variable, we remove outliers from the 
sample: we define outliers as values of the dependent variable greater than one or more 
than three standard deviations from the mean. The ratio is then regressed on the logarithm 
of total household expenditure per household member to estimate the Engle curve. In 
addition, we include individual characteristics, particularly health condition, in the vector 
of explanatory variables. For instance, the survey subjectively asked the sampled men 
whether they were healthy, whether their spouse was still living, and if so, whether she 
was healthy. We also include the number of family members and a dummy variable 
indicating whether a respondent was working. 
                                                 
10 We do not consider the option of distinguishing between Group 1 and the remaining groups, as Group 1 
includes few households. 
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Because our purpose is to compare medical expenditures before and after the 
date of implementation of the health reforms, we first remove any cross sectional 
observations with data missing in 2001 or 2003 to obtain a balanced panel. The sample 
size is then 81 households per year when the employment status of spouses is included in 
grouping the treatment and control groups (that is, <Treatment A> and <Treatment B>). 
However, the sample size substantially increases to 215 per year when the employment 
status of spouses does not categorize the two groups (that is, <Treatment C>).11
Table 3 details the distribution of employment status each year. In <Treatment 
A> and <Treatment B>, where the employment status of spouses is taken into account in 
grouping, the proportion of those who were nonemployed increased from 25.93% to 
27.16% over the period. In contrast, the proportion of regular employees decreased from 
14.81% to 13.58% over the same period. Nonregular employees (1), here considered as 
substantially regular employees, accounted for 28.40% of the sample in 2001, and this 
decreased markedly to 20.99% in 2003. More than one-quarter of the sampled men were 
self-employed in 2001, while about one-third were self-employed in 2003. As one would 
expect, the proportion of employees decreased over the sample period, while the 
proportion of nonemployed increased. Similarly, spouses engaging in nonregular work 
were more likely to reduce their working hours or to be nonemployed during both periods. 
When we ignore the employment status of spouses in grouping (<Treatment C>), the 
proportions of regular and nonregular employees (1) decreased, while that of 
nonemployed increased. We then again confirm that older men were less likely to work. 
 Table 2 
provides some summary statistics. As shown, the share of medical expenditures in total 
household expenditure decreased from 2001 to 2003 in <Treatment A> and <Treatment 
B>. However, the difference is minimal in <Treatment C>. 
Table 4 displays a transition matrix of employment status from 2001 to 2003. In 
<Treatment A> and <Treatment B>, the majority of men maintained their employment 
status in 2001 and 2003. For example, 75% of regular employees remained regularly 
employed and only 8.33% became nonemployed, while 65.22% of nonregular employees 
(1) maintained their employment status from 2001 to 2003 and only 4.35% became 
                                                 
11 The sample size is smaller in <Treatment A> and <Treatment B> because many observations are missing 
for the annual income of employed spouses (female) used for grouping by employment status. 
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nonemployed. However, we can also see that employees gradually reduced their work 
burden from regular employment to nonregular employment or retirement (or 
nonemployment). In a similar manner, spouses engaging in regular work also reduced 
their working hours or retired as they became older while some nonregular spouses 
increased their work burden. We observe similar results with <Treatment C>. 
Table 5 provides the transition matrices of those incurring an increase in the 
self-pay ratio of medical expenditures across the three treatments. As shown in 
<Treatment A>, 71.60% of households are not subject to the increase in the self-pay ratio 
from 20% to 30%. As most are middle- or old-aged, they are less likely to have regular 
employment, and are therefore exempt from the health insurance reforms. When we 
group individual men according to <Treatment B>, 54.32% of households did not incur 
any additional burden from the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures. In 
<Treatment C>, 38.60% of men joined an employees’ insurance program in 2003 and 
therefore had to pay the additional payments of medical services after the health reforms 
took effect. 
 
 
Results 
Table 6 presents the estimates of the Engle curve for the policy effect on medical 
expenditures from estimating the first-difference model with the balanced panel data. 
Columns [1] and [4] provide the results when samples are grouped according to 
<Treatment A>; columns [2] and [5] provide the results for <Treatment B>, and columns 
[3] and [6] for <Treatment C>. The key outcome is that the coefficient on the policy 
parameter (insurance type × year) is positive but statistically insignificant in all columns, 
implying that the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures increased the 
share of household expenditure spent on medical services, but that this  is not statistically 
supported. Recall that while the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures 
increased the price of medical services, it simultaneously lowered the quantity demanded 
of medical services. Our estimated results suggest that the former effect was dominant 
over the latter one, but it should be aware that the net effect is statistically insignificant. In 
addition, this provides corroborating evidence that if anything, the increase in the self-pay 
ratio of medical expenditures would mildly decrease total medical expenditures (that is, 
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the sum of the expenditure incurred by an individual household and the health care 
benefits incurred by the Japanese government). 
One possible reason why this policy effect is statistically insignificant is that the 
survey date of 2003 was so close to the implementation of the reforms that the effect of 
the reforms had not yet been felt. It is then necessary to attempt to capture the lasting 
effect of the reforms. Another possible reason is that the sample size is relatively small in 
the balanced panel data, which leads to a large standard error for the policy parameter, and 
thereby lowers the significance of the policy parameter. We should keep in mind that the 
increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures had the potential to increase the 
share of household expenditure spent on medical services, although its effect was 
statistically insignificant in our estimations when using small samples. 
Considering the other factors determining the share of medical expenditures, the 
coefficient for total expenditure per household member is negative at the 1% level of 
significance in all columns. This confirms, as in Sawano (2000), that medical services are 
a necessary good. The number of family members has a negative effect on medical 
expenditures at the 5% level of significance in columns [4] to [6]. The share of medical 
expenditures lowers with the number of family members, holding the total expenditure 
per household member fixed. These results show the way of allocating a family budget to 
medical services and other goods and services as the number of family members increases, 
given that the total expenditure per household member is fixed. This could be because 
while an individual man and his spouse are usually both middle- or old-aged, we expect 
that other family members are younger and healthier, and so would rather direct 
expenditure to consumption than to health care. As family size increases, therefore, the 
share of medical expenditures in total household expenditure declines. 12
                                                 
12 Note that the coefficient on the number of family members captures the partial effect of an increase in the 
self-pay ratio of medical expenditures on the share of medical expenditures in household expenditure, 
holding the total expenditure per household member fixed. The complete effect can be obtained if we 
regress the share of medical expenditures on family size and the logarithm of total household expenditure.  
The complete effect would be expected positive; if one more member joins in a family while the total 
household expenditure is fixed, the share of medical expenditures in household expenditure is expected to 
increase because the new member also spends the money for medical services. 
 Finally, 
own-health negatively affects the ratio of medical expenditures at the 5% level of 
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significance according to column [6]; contrary to our predictions, however, the 
own-health of the spouse increases the share of medical expenditures, but only at the 10% 
level of significance in column [4]. 
To obtain more precise estimators, we employ an alternative approach using the 
data as repeated cross-sectional observations. Because the data include unbalanced 
observations, this allows us to increase the sample size. Table 7 presents the estimated 
results. In contrast to the results shown in Table 6, the coefficient on the policy variable 
turns out to be positive at the 5–10% level of significance in columns [2], [3], [5], and [6]. 
In effect, the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures has increased the share 
of household expenditure spent on medical services. This implies that the price elasticity 
of demand for medical services was less than one in absolute terms; that is, the quantity 
demanded of medical services did not decrease sufficiently to counter the increased 
burden of medical expenditures caused by the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical 
expenditures. 
We should take care when interpreting these results. As mentioned earlier, if the 
composition of the treatment and control groups systematically changed after the 
legislative change, the policy parameter is potentially biased because any difference in 
the demand for medical services between the two groups could be attributable to 
unobservable differences between the two groups with respect to individual 
characteristics as well as to the legislative change. 
Table 8 provides the first-difference estimators for the subsample of respondents 
aged 61 years or older in 2001. We anticipate two opposing effects of an increase in the 
self-pay ratio of medical expenditures. The first is that that the increase in the self-pay 
ratio of medical expenditures seriously increases the burden of medical expenditures for 
those aged 61 years or older because they typically require more medical care. The 
second is that the health insurance reforms do not affect household medical expenditures 
for those aged 61 years or older as they have already retired because many Japanese 
companies implement an age-based retirement system and set the retirement age at 60 
years. 
The results are similar to those in Table 6. That is, the health insurance reforms 
positively but insignificantly affected the burden of household expenditures for medical 
services for men aged 61 years or older. However, the coefficient on the policy variable is 
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smaller in magnitude in Table 8 than in Table 6. This suggests that the health insurance 
reforms had only a minor effect on medical expenditures for those aged 61 years or older. 
These results instead support the second hypothesis that the increase in the self-pay ratio 
of medical expenditures did not affect the burden of medical expenses for those aged 61 
years or older. To obtain more precise estimators,  Table 9 shows the estimated results 
using the repeated cross-section data that include any unbalanced observations. The 
coefficient on the policy variable turns out to be positive but only at the 10% level of 
significance in columns [3] and [6] for <Treatment C>. This implies that the increase in 
the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures increased the share of household expenses 
spent on medical services, although the impact was only statistically marginal. 
In both Tables 8 and 9, the coefficient on total expenditure per household 
member is still negative, again implying that medical services are a necessary good. We 
also find that the coefficient is larger in magnitude for those aged 61 years or older than 
for the unrestricted sample shown in Tables 6 and 7. Consequently, medical services are 
more strongly a necessary good for those aged 61 years or older.  
To see whether the effect of the legislative change on medical expenditures vary 
by the budget share of medical expenditures,  Table 10 presents the estimates of quantile 
regressions for the five quantile values {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9}. Column [1] shows the 
result when samples are grouped according to <Treatment A>, followed by column [2] 
for <Treatment B>, and column [3] for <Treatment C>. In columns [1] to [3], the 
coefficient on the policy variable (insurance type × year) remains insignificant for all of 
the quantile values. 
In column [1], while the sign of the coefficients on the policy variable is negative 
for the lower quantile value, their sign turns out to be positive for the higher quantile 
values. While an increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures increased the price 
of medical services, it simultaneously decreased the quantity demanded, thereby 
lowering the household expenditure of medical services. For higher quantile values, the 
former effect dominates the latter, although the net effect is statistically insignificant.  
This implies that this particular health insurance reforms did not cut demand for medical 
services more sharply for households with a higher burden of medical expenditures in 
total household expenditure. The sign of the coefficient on the policy variable remains 
positive, regardless of the quantile value in column [2]. The observed policy impact on 
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the demand for medical services then substantially varies according to the criteria used to 
define the treatment and control groups. 
The coefficient on total expenditure per household member remains 
significantly negative for any quantile value, regardless of the type of treatment. This is 
consistent with the estimates in Tables 6 and 7. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient also increases almost systematically with the quantile value. This again 
implies that medical services are more strongly a necessary good for households with a 
higher share of medical expenditures in total household expenditure. 
The coefficients for the number of family members, own-health, and spouse’s 
own-health are significantly negative for many quantile values in all columns. As 
discussed, family members other than the sample man and his spouse are usually younger 
and healthier, so the increase in the family size would encourage the family to allocate its 
budget to other goods and services rather than medical services, which lowers the ratio of 
medical expenditures to household expenditure. Needless to say, a healthy man and his 
spouse do not spend much on medical services. The coefficient for work is significantly 
positive for many quantile values. That is, if a middle- or old-aged man works too much, 
he requires more medical care to maintain his health condition. 
Table 11 presents the estimates of the quantile regressions when the sample data 
are limited to male household heads aged 61 years or older. As shown, the coefficient on 
the policy variable is insignificant for any quantile value. The coefficient on total 
expenditure per household remains significantly negative for each quantile value in all 
columns. This confirms again that medical services are a necessary good for men aged 61 
years or older. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
Using a panel of two-period data gathered by the NLI Research Institute, this paper 
explored the hypothesis that the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures 
associated with health insurance reforms taking effect in Japan in April 2003 cut 
household medical expenditure. We focused our attention on the consumption of medical 
services for middle- and old-aged persons, whose share of the Japanese population has 
been rapidly growing in recent years. We estimated Engle curves for medical services and 
 19 
employed the difference-in-difference method, dividing our sample into a treatment 
group whose self-pay ratio of medical expenditures increased from 20% to 30%, and a 
control group whose self-pay ratio remained unchanged. In addition, we estimated 
quantile regressions to consider any heterogeneity in the effect of this legislative change 
across different groups by medical expenditure. 
Our main finding using the balanced panel data is that the increase in the self-pay 
ratio had a positive but insignificant effect on household medical expenses. This result 
implies that a decrease in the quantity demanded of medical services through the price 
rise is not enough to offset the increase in the medical expenditures incurred by a 
household through the price rise, although this net effect is statistically insignificant. If 
anything, the price elasticity of demand for medical services by middle- and old-aged 
persons was  rather inelastic. We obtained similar results when limiting our sample data to 
persons aged 61 years or older. 
Our plans for this line of research involve capturing the long-term effect, if any, 
of the 2003 health insurance reforms. One possible reason why we found a somewhat  
insignificant effect of the reforms is that the survey date in 2003 was so close to the date 
of implementation. Accordingly, the reforms may not yet have had time to be effective. 
Capturing any lasting effect of the reforms is then a crucial task. 
Another possible reason is the small sample size; that is, because the sample size 
is relatively small, we obtain a large standard error of the policy parameter, thus reducing 
the significance of the policy parameter. To address this shortcoming, we estimated the 
policy effect using the data as repeated cross-sectional observations. This allowed us to 
include unbalanced observations and thereby increase the sample size. We then found that 
the increase in the self-pay ratio had a significantly positive effect on the share of 
household medical expenditures. This result implies that middle- and old-aged persons 
were unable to cut sufficiently the quantity demanded of medical services in response to 
the increase in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures. However, we should be aware 
that this policy effect could include potential bias if the composition of the treatment and 
control groups systematically changed following implementation of the reforms. 
We also found that per household expenditure had a significantly negative effect 
on medical expenditures, implying (as expected) that medical services are a necessary 
good. After confining the sample data to persons aged 61 years or older, this coefficient 
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became larger in absolute terms. Accordingly, medical services are more strongly a 
necessary good for those requiring more medical care. We verify these results using the 
estimates of the quantile regressions, and confirm that the coefficient on household 
expenditure per household member increases in absolute terms with the quantile value. 
This suggests that medical services are more strongly a necessary good for individuals 
from households where medical expenditures account for a larger share of total household 
expenditure. 
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Table 1: Cross-sectional Matrix of Health Insurance Types 
Employment status over JPY X* million JPY 1.3** （annual income) less than JPY 1.3** million
wife for annual salary ～X* million (annual salary) (annual inome) bereaved
husband (regular employee) (nonregular employee) (nonregular employee+nonemployed)
regular employee husband employee's insurance employee's insurance employee's insurance employee's insurace
wife employee's insurance national insurance employee's insurance (dependent)
nonregular employee (1) husband employee's insurance employee's insurance employee's insurance employee's insurace
wife employee's insurance national insurance employee's insurance (dependent)
nonregular employee (2) husband national insurance national insurance national insurance national insurance
wife employee's insurance national insurance national insurance
nonregular employee (3) husband employee's insurance (dependent) national insurance national insurance national insurance
wife employee's insurance national insurance national insurance
self-employed husband national insurance national insurance national insurance national insurance
wife employee's insurance national insurance national insurance
nonemployed husband employee's insurance (dependent) national insurance national insurance national insurance
wife employee's insurance national insurance national insurance
Group 1 Both incurred increases in the self-pay ratio of medical expenditures for outpatient and hospital treatments from 20% to 30%.
Group 2
Group 3 The regular employee incurred increases in the burden of medical expenditures for both hospital and outpatient treatments, 
while the burden born by the spouse (non-regular employee or the employer) had remained unchanged.
Group 4 The revision of the health insurance act had no adverse impact on the burden of medical expenditures.
Husband
regular employee those who self-reported that they worked as a regular employee
nonregular employee (1) those who self-reported that they worked as a non-regular worker, and responded that they worked 
three quarters of regular employees’ weekly hours of work, 30 hours a week or more.
nonregular employee (2)  those who self-reported that they worked as a  non-regular worker, responded that they worked less than three 
quarters of regular employees’ weekly hours of work (30 hours a week), and earned an annual income of over 
JPY 1.3 million if aged under 60 years or over JPY1.8 million if aged over 60 years
nonregular employee (3) those who self-reported that they worked as a non-regular worker, responded that they worked less than three 
quarters of regular employees’ weekly hours of work (30 hours a week), and earned an annual income of less than 
JPY 1.3 million if aged under 60 years or less than JPY1.8 million if aged over 60 years
self-employed those who self-reported that they worked as a self-employed worker, including professionals
nonemployed those who did not reported that they worked, including the retired
* JPY2.74 million (40 - 44 yrs of age), JPY2.81 million (45 - 49 yrs of age), JPY2.90 million (50 - 54 yrs of age) 
 JPY2.89 million between (55 - 59 yrs of age), JPY2.33 million (60 - 64 yrs of age), and JPY2.23 million (over 65 yrs of age)
** JPY1.8 million for spouses more than 60 years of age
the % of medical expenditures for the regular employee was raised from 20% to 30% for both outpatient and hospital treatments,
but the % for the spouse (non-regular employee or the non-employee) was raised from 20% to 30% only for hospital treatments.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
2001
Variable        Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
medical cost/expenditure 81 0.096 0.106 0.006 0.500
ln(per expenditure) 81 4.349 0.537 3.219 5.695
# of family 81 2.802 1.134 1 7
health (=1) 79 0.810 0.395 0 1
work (=1) 81 0.741 0.441 0 1
spouse (=1) 81 0.926 0.264 0 1
spouse's health (=1) 81 0.778 0.418 0 1
group 1 81 0.062 0.242 0 1
group 2 81 0.235 0.426 0 1
group 3 81 0.198 0.401 0 1
group 4 81 0.506 0.503 0 1
2003
Variable        Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
medical cost/expenditure 81 0.089 0.095 0.008 0.600
ln(per expenditure) 81 4.329 0.611 2.108 5.520
# of family 81 2.852 1.174 1 7
health (=1) 80 0.788 0.412 0 1
work (=1) 81 0.728 0.448 0 1
spouse (=1) 81 0.926 0.264 0 1
spouse's health (=1) 81 0.753 0.434 0 1
group 1 81 0.025 0.156 0 1
group 2 81 0.259 0.441 0 1
group 3 81 0.173 0.380 0 1
group 4 81 0.543 0.501 0 1
The employment status of spouses is categorized by their annual income or earnings.
2001
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
medical cost/expenditure 215 0.109 0.134 0.005 0.818
ln(per expenditure) 215 4.258 0.672 1.273 5.858
# of family 215 2.991 1.211 1 7
health (=1) 215 0.781 0.414 0 1
work (=1) 215 0.721 0.450 0 1
spouse (=1) 215 0.972 0.165 0 1
spouse's health (=1) 215 0.809 0.394 0 1
employee's insurance (=1) 215 0.447 0.498 0 1
2003
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
medical cost/expenditure 215 0.110 0.126 0.006 0.667
ln(per expenditure) 215 4.292 0.596 2.108 5.520
# of family 215 2.981 1.260 1 7
health (=1) 215 0.772 0.420 0 1
work (=1) 215 0.674 0.470 0 1
spouse (=1) 215 0.967 0.178 0 1
spouse's health (=1) 215 0.800 0.401 0 1
employee's insurance (=1) 215 0.386 0.488 0 1
(1) The employment status of spouses is taken into account in grouping.
<Treatments A & B>
(2) The employment status of spouses is not taken into account in grouping
<Treatments C>
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Table 3: Distribution of Employment Status 
(1) The employment status of spouses is taken into account in grouping. <Treatments A & B>
Husband (male) 2001 2003
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
regular employee 12 14.81 14.81 11 13.58 13.58
nonregular employee (1) 23 28.40 43.21 17 20.99 34.57
nonregular employee (2) 1 1.23 44.44 1 1.23 35.80
nonregular employee (3) 1 1.23 45.67 3 3.70 39.50
self-employed 23 28.40 74.07 27 33.33 72.83
nonemployed 21 25.93 100.00 22 27.16 100.00
Total 81 100.00 81 100.00
Spouse (female) 2001 2003
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
regular employee 9 12.00 12.00 10 13.33 13.33
nonregular employee (over JPY1.3 million) 21 28.00 40.00 19 25.33 38.66
nonregular (less JPY1.3 million)+nonemployed 45 60.00 100.00 46 61.33 100.00
Total 75 100.00 75 100.00
The employment status of spouses is categorized by their annual income or earnings.
(2) The employment status of spouses is not taken into account in grouping. <Treatment C>
Male 2001 2003
Freq. Percent Cum. Percent Cum.
regular employee 35 16.28 16.28 26 12.09 12.09
nonregular employee (1) 61 28.37 44.65 57 26.51 38.60
nonregular employee (2) 2 0.93 45.58 1 0.47 39.07
nonregular employee (3) 4 1.86 47.44 8 3.72 42.79
self-employed 53 24.65 72.09 53 24.65 67.44
nonemployed 60 27.91 100.00 70 32.56 100.00
Total 215 100.00 215 100.00
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Table 4: Transitions of Employment Status
(1) The employment status of spouses is taken into account in grouping. <Treatments A & B>
Husband    2003 nonregular nonregular nonregular 
2001 regular (1) (2) (3) self-employed nonemployed Total
regular 9 1 0 1 0 1 12
75.00 8.33 0.00 8.33 0.00 8.33 100.00
nonregular (1) 2 15 1 1 3 1 23
8.70 65.22 4.35 4.35 13.04 4.35 100.00
nonregular (2) 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
nonregular (3) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
self-employed 0 0 0 0 23 0 23
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
nonemployed 0 0 0 0 1 20 21
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.76 95.24 100.00
Total 11 17 1 3 27 22 81
13.58 20.99 1.23 3.70 33.33 27.16 100.00
Spouse 2003 nonregular+
2001 regular nonregular nonemployed Total
regular 7 1 9
77.78 11.11 11.11 100.00
nonregular (over JPY1.3 million) 0 7 14 21
0.00 33.33 66.67 100.00
nonregular (less JPY 1.3 million) 3 38 4 45
+ nonemployed 6.67 84.44 8.89 100.00
Total 10 46 19 75
13.33 61.33 25.33 100.00
The employment status of spouses is categorized by their annual income or earnings.
(2) The employment status of spouses is not taken into account in grouping. <Treatment C>
Male           2003 nonregular nonregular nonregular 
2001 regular (1) (2) (3) self-employed nonemployed Total
regular 25 7 0 1 1 1 35
71.43 20.00 0.00 2.86 2.86 2.86 100.00
nonregular (1) 0 43 1 4 4 9 61
0.00 70.49 1.64 6.56 6.56 14.75 100.00
nonregular (2) 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
nonregular (3) 0 3 0 1 0 0 4
0.00 75.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
self-employed 0 1 0 1 45 6 53
0.00 1.89 0.00 1.89 84.91 11.32 100.00
nonemployed 1 1 0 1 3 54 60
1.67 1.67 0.00 1.67 5.00 90.00 100.00
Total 26 57 1 8 53 70 215
12.09 26.51 0.47 3.72 24.65 32.56 100.00
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Table 5: Transitions of Medical Insurance Programs
<Treatment A>
2003
2001 0 1 Total
0 52 5 57
91.23 8.77 100.00
1 6 18 24
25.00 75.00 100.00
Total 58 23 81
71.60 28.40 100.00
group 1 and 2 = 1, group 3 and 4 = 0
We assume that group 1 and 2 are adversely affected by the revision of 
the health insurance act.
<Treatment B>
2003
2001 0 1 Total
0 39 2 41
95.12 4.88 100.00
1 5 35 40
12.50 87.50 100.00
Total 44 37 81
54.32 45.68 100.00
group 1, 2 and 3 = 1, group 4 = 0
We assume that group 1, 2 and 3 are adversely affected by the revision of 
the health insurance act.
<Treatment C>
2003
2001 0 1 Total
0 111 8 119
93.28 6.72 100.0
1 21 75 96
21.88 78.13 100.0
Total 132 83 215
61.40 38.60 100.00
employee's insurance program = 1
national insurance program = 0
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Table 6: Estimated Results (First Difference Estimation) 
denpendent value: ∆(medical cost/expenditure)
independent A B C A B C
variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ln(per expenditure) -0.114 *** -0.119 *** -0.127 *** -0.130 *** -0.134 *** -0.138 ***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.020) (0.033) (0.032) (0.019)
∆insurance status -0.033 -0.019 0.016 -0.009 -0.001 0.035
(0.030) (0.025) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.021)
∆insurance status×year 0.045 0.039 0.012 0.037 0.033 0.007
(0.031) (0.024) (0.020) (0.034) (0.023) (0.019)
∆# of family -0.040 ** -0.041 ** -0.027 **
(0.019) (0.018) (0.014)
∆own health -0.026 -0.027 -0.053 **
(0.040) (0.039) (0.027)
∆ work 0.025 0.018 -0.037
(0.048) (0.041) (0.028)
∆spouse dropped dropped
∆spouse's health 0.057 * 0.055
(0.032) (0.034)
constant -0.022 * -0.028 * 0.001 -0.017 -0.021 0.002
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Number of obs      81 81 215 78 78 215
F value 6.55 5.36 14.55 4.09 3.83 10.04
Prob > F           0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
R2 0.374 0.373 0.292 0.424 0.426 0.328
Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant
[1] and [4]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1or 2, but otherwise 0. <Treatment A>
[2] and [5]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1, 2 or 3 but otherwise 0. <Treatment B>
[3] and [6]: the insurance status =1 if a man belongs to the employee's insurance program, but otherwise 0. <Treatment C>
Note that there are a few husbands who lost their wife in the balanced panel, so the spouse dummy was dropped in [4] and [5].
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Table 7: Estimated Results (Repeated Cross-Section) 
dependent value: medical cost/expenditure
independent A B C A B C
variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ln(per expenditure) -0.051 *** -0.052 *** -0.069 *** -0.066 *** -0.068 *** -0.094 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
year (2003=1) 0.001 -0.009 -0.011 0.007 -0.007 -0.010
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
insurance status -0.021 * -0.012 -0.030 *** -0.020 -0.014 -0.021 *
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011)
insurance status×year 0.017 0.037 ** 0.030 * 0.008 0.038 ** 0.030 **
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015)
# of family -0.015 ** -0.015 *** -0.026 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
own health -0.032 * -0.031 * -0.026 *
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
work 0.036 *** 0.026 ** 0.005
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
spouse 0.038 0.039
(0.024) (0.024)
spouse's health -0.055 ** -0.055 **
(0.021) (0.022)
constant 0.311 *** 0.316 *** 0.409 *** 0.427 *** 0.446 *** 0.608 ***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.045) (0.070) (0.071) (0.061)
Number of obs      392 392 733 385 385 721
F value 5.846 5.375 13.949 6.375 6.665 14.294
Prob > F           0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.100 0.106 0.140 0.179 0.184 0.199
Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant
[1] and [4]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1or 2, but otherwise 0. <Treatment A>
[2] and [5]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1, 2 or 3 but otherwise 0. <Treatment B>
[3] and [6]: the insurance status =1 if a man belongs to the employee's insurance program, but otherwise 0. <Treatment C>
The OLS model is estimated using the repeated cross-section data.
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Table 8: Estimated Results (First Difference Estimation): 61 years of age or older
dependent value: ∆(medical cost/expenditure)
independent A B C A B C
variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
∆ln(per expenditure) -0.141 *** -0.144 *** -0.143 *** -0.157 *** -0.158 *** -0.146 ***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.026)
∆insurance status -0.017 0.011 0.024 0.016 0.023 0.027
(0.035) (0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) (0.020)
∆insurance status×year 0.026 0.018 0.023 0.013 0.013 0.020
(0.035) (0.029) (0.026) (0.039) (0.028) (0.027)
∆# of family -0.044 * -0.041 * -0.011
(0.026) (0.024) (0.016)
∆own health -0.020 -0.020 -0.036
(0.063) (0.062) (0.039)
∆ work 0.019 0.013 -0.001
(0.043) (0.042) (0.022)
∆spouse dropped dropped
∆spouse's health 0.025 0.025
(0.048) (0.047)
constant -0.028 * -0.027 -0.008 -0.023 -0.023 -0.006
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015)
Number of obs     51 51 138 50 50 138
F value 8.34 8.74 12.28 4.99 6.16 7.03
Prob > F           0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.519 0.519 0.351 0.559 0.560 0.358
Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant
[1] and [4]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1or 2, but otherwise 0. <Treatment A>
[2] and [5]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1, 2 or 3 but otherwise 0. <Treatment B>
[3] and [6]: the insurance status =1 if a man belongs to the employee's insurance program, but otherwise 0. <Treatment C>
Note that there are a few husbands who lost their wife in the balanced panel data, so the spouse dummy was dropped in [4] and [5].
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Table 9: Estimated Results (Repeated Cross-Section): 61 years of age or older
dependent value: medical cost/expenditure
independent A B C A B C
variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ln(per expenditure) -0.059 *** -0.059 *** -0.072 *** -0.082 *** -0.085 *** -0.102 ***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017)   (0.017)   (0.014)
year (2003=1) -0.007 -0.013 -0.017 -0.002   -0.008   -0.013
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.013)   (0.012)
insurance status -0.027 -0.008 -0.030 ** -0.021   0.004   -0.023
(0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.014)
insurance status×year 0.022 0.031 0.034 * 0.015   0.030   0.031 *
(0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023)   (0.021)   (0.017)
# of family -0.021 *** -0.022 *** -0.029 ***
(0.007)   (0.006)   (0.005)
own health -0.039 ** -0.041 ** -0.027 *
(0.018)   (0.018)   (0.015)
work 0.030 ** 0.014   0.004
(0.015)   (0.013)   (0.014)
spouse 0.025   0.023   
(0.029)   (0.029)   
spouse's health -0.048 * -0.050 *
(0.027)   (0.027)   
constant 0.350 *** 0.347 *** 0.425 *** 0.533 *** 0.554 *** 0.651 ***
(0.068) (0.070) (0.055) (0.090)   (0.090)   (0.074)
Number of obs     275 275 503 271 271 494
F value 4.994 3.923 9.759 5.140 5.248 10.328
Prob > F           0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.133 0.136 0.154 0.244 0.254 0.220
Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant
[1] and [4]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1or 2, but otherwise 0. <Treatment A>
[2] and [5]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1, 2 or 3 but otherwise 0. <Treatment B>
[3] and [6]: the insurance status =1 if a man belongs to the employee's insurance program, but otherwise 0. <Treatment C>
The OLS model is estimated using the repeated cross-section data.
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Table 10: Quantile Regression Results 
[1] A [2] B [3] C
medical cost/expenditure Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
q10 ln(per expenditure) -0.020 (0.002) *** -0.019 (0.002) *** -0.023 (0.001) ***
year (2003=1) 0.005 (0.003) 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002)
insurance status 0.000 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) -0.002 (0.003)
insurance status×year -0.006 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) -0.001 (0.003)
# of family -0.006 (0.001) *** -0.005 (0.001) *** -0.007 (0.001) ***
own health (=1) -0.008 (0.003) ** -0.008 (0.004) ** -0.007 (0.002) ***
work (=1) 0.007 (0.003) *** 0.007 (0.003) ** 0.006 (0.002) ***
spouse (=1) 0.003 (0.006) 0.006 (0.006)
spouse's health (=1) -0.003 (0.004) -0.007 (0.004)
q25 ln(per expenditure) -0.029 (0.003) *** -0.029 (0.003) *** -0.036 (0.002) ***
year (2003=1) 0.006 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
insurance status -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.005) -0.001 (0.004)
insurance status×year 0.001 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006) 0.006 (0.005)
# of family -0.010 (0.001) *** -0.010 (0.001) *** -0.011 (0.001) ***
own health (=1) -0.013 (0.004) *** -0.014 (0.004) *** -0.014 (0.003) **
work (=1) 0.018 (0.004) *** 0.018 (0.004) *** 0.008 (0.003)
spouse (=1) -0.003 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008)
spouse's health (=1) -0.006 (0.005) -0.005 (0.005)
q50 ln(per expenditure) -0.042 (0.004) *** -0.042 (0.005) *** -0.057 (0.004) ***
year (2003=1) 0.009 (0.005) ** 0.003 (0.007) -0.001 (0.006)
insurance status -0.008 (0.006) -0.007 (0.009) -0.008 (0.007)
insurance status×year -0.008 (0.009) 0.008 (0.011) 0.012 (0.009)
# of family -0.011 (0.002) *** -0.012 (0.003) *** -0.018 (0.002) ***
own health (=1) -0.017 (0.005) *** -0.014 (0.007) ** -0.024 (0.006) ***
work (=1) 0.026 (0.005) *** 0.020 (0.007) *** 0.004 (0.006)
spouse (=1) 0.000 (0.010) 0.010 (0.013)
spouse's health (=1) -0.032 (0.006) *** -0.035 (0.009) ***
q75 ln(per expenditure) -0.055 (0.010) *** -0.061 (0.011) *** -0.097 (0.013) ***
year (2003=1) 0.012 (0.011) 0.000 (0.013) -0.002 (0.015)
insurance status -0.032 (0.015) ** -0.005 (0.016) -0.019 (0.019)
insurance status×year 0.023 (0.020) 0.025 (0.019) 0.007 (0.024)
# of family -0.010 (0.005) ** -0.011 (0.005) ** -0.027 (0.006) ***
own health (=1) -0.039 (0.011) *** -0.045 (0.012) *** -0.025 (0.015) *
work (=1) 0.033 (0.012) *** 0.021 (0.013) 0.022 (0.016)
spouse (=1) 0.038 (0.022) * 0.039 (0.023) *
spouse's health (=1) -0.079 (0.014) *** -0.087 (0.015) ***
q90 ln(per expenditure) -0.109 (0.038) *** -0.114 (0.035) *** -0.150 (0.037) ***
year (2003=1) 0.024 (0.032) 0.002 (0.033) -0.038 (0.040)
insurance status -0.003 (0.044) 0.026 (0.040) -0.070 (0.048)
insurance status×year -0.001 (0.059) 0.033 (0.051) 0.067 (0.061)
# of family -0.018 (0.016) -0.015 (0.015) -0.027 (0.014) *
own health (=1) -0.092 (0.035) *** -0.084 (0.033) ** -0.034 (0.040)
work (=1) 0.070 (0.033) ** 0.040 (0.033) 0.022 (0.042)
spouse (=1) 0.207 (0.064) *** 0.176 (0.058) ***
spouse's health (=1) -0.233 (0.044) *** -0.232 (0.038) ***
Number of obs 385 385 721
.10 Pseudo R2 0.076 0.073 0.077
.25 Pseudo R2 0.089 0.089 0.087
.50 Pseudo R2 0.113 0.109 0.101
.75 Pseudo R2 0.141 0.144 0.134
.90 Pseudo R2 0.193 0.200 0.161
Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant
[1]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1or 2, but otherwise 0. <Treatment A>
[2]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1, 2 or 3 but otherwise 0.<Treatment B>
[3]: the insurance status =1 if a man belongs to the employee's insurance program, but otherwise 0.<Treatmen C>
The quantile regression model is estimated using the repeated cross-section data.
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Table 11: Quantile Regression Results: 61 years of age or older 
[1] A [2] B [3] C
medical cost/expenditure Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
q10 ln(per expenditure) -0.020 (0.002) *** -0.022 (0.002) *** -0.026 (0.002) ***
year (2003=1) 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
insurance status -0.005 (0.006) -0.006 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005)
insurance status×year 0.002 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007) 0.002 (0.006)
# of family -0.005 (0.001) *** -0.006 (0.002) *** -0.008 (0.001) ***
own health (=1) -0.009 (0.004) *** -0.008 (0.004) ** -0.012 (0.003) ***
work (=1) 0.009 (0.003) *** 0.008 (0.004) ** 0.008 (0.003) **
spouse (=1) 0.006 (0.008) 0.007 (0.009)
spouse's health (=1) -0.010 (0.005) ** -0.009 (0.005) *
q25 ln(per expenditure) -0.033 (0.003) *** -0.034 (0.003) *** -0.039 (0.002) ***
year (2003=1) 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004)
insurance status -0.005 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) -0.001 (0.006)
insurance status×year 0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007)
# of family -0.011 (0.002) *** -0.011 (0.002) *** -0.011 (0.001) ***
own health (=1) -0.015 (0.004) *** -0.013 (0.004) *** -0.015 (0.004) ***
work (=1) 0.019 (0.004) *** 0.016 (0.004) *** 0.009 (0.004) **
spouse (=1) -0.004 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008)
spouse's health (=1) -0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.005)
q50 ln(per expenditure) -0.049 (0.004) *** -0.048 (0.005) *** -0.059 (0.005) ***
year (2003=1) 0.007 (0.005) 0.004 (0.007) -0.001 (0.007)
insurance status -0.006 (0.008) -0.002 (0.010) -0.004 (0.010)
insurance status×year -0.005 (0.010) 0.009 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012)
# of family -0.015 (0.002) *** -0.016 (0.003) *** -0.018 (0.003) ***
own health (=1) -0.020 (0.005) *** -0.020 (0.007) *** -0.027 (0.007) ***
work (=1) 0.023 (0.005) *** 0.018 (0.007) ** 0.001 (0.007)
spouse (=1) 0.017 (0.009) ** 0.013 (0.013)
spouse's health (=1) -0.026 (0.006) *** -0.027 (0.009) ***
q75 ln(per expenditure) -0.069 (0.015) *** -0.069 (0.009) *** -0.103 (0.011) ***
year (2003=1) 0.007 (0.015) 0.002 (0.010) -0.011 (0.013)
insurance status -0.028 (0.025) 0.007 (0.015) -0.013 (0.019)
insurance status×year 0.022 (0.030) 0.024 (0.016) 0.013 (0.022)
# of family -0.018 (0.008) ** -0.014 (0.005) *** -0.032 (0.006) ***
own health (=1) -0.048 (0.016) *** -0.051 (0.010) *** -0.027 (0.013) **
work (=1) 0.028 (0.015) * 0.008 (0.010) 0.008 (0.013)
spouse (=1) 0.035 (0.029) 0.030 (0.017) *
spouse's health (=1) -0.071 (0.019) *** -0.072 (0.012) ***
q90 ln(per expenditure) -0.149 (0.039) *** -0.133 (0.039) *** -0.149 (0.046) ***
year (2003=1) 0.008 (0.032) 0.010 (0.033) -0.029 (0.046)
insurance status -0.023 (0.050) 0.017 (0.048) -0.055 (0.067)
insurance status×year 0.003 (0.062) 0.011 (0.056) 0.072 (0.079)
# of family -0.018 (0.014) -0.016 (0.014) -0.035 (0.016) **
own health (=1) -0.076 (0.034) ** -0.092 (0.033) *** -0.012 (0.046)
work (=1) 0.060 (0.034) * 0.039 (0.033) 0.022 (0.048)
spouse (=1) 0.211 (0.063) *** 0.184 (0.054) ***
spouse's health (=1) -0.271 (0.042) *** -0.260 (0.044) ***
Number of obs 271 271 494
.10 Pseudo R2 0.095 0.095 0.082
.25 Pseudo R2 0.101 0.100 0.093
.50 Pseudo R2 0.123 0.119 0.111
.75 Pseudo R2 0.161 0.170 0.155
.90 Pseudo R2 0.257 0.261 0.185
Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors. *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant
[1]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1or 2, but otherwise 0. <Treatment A>
[2]: the insurance status =1 if a household belongs to either group 1, 2 or 3 but otherwise 0.<Treatment B>
[3]: the insurance status =1 if a man belongs to the employee's insurance program, but otherwise 0.<Treatmen C>
The quantile regression model is estimated using the repeated cross-section data.
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Figure 1: Overview of The 2003 Health Insurance Reform in Japan 
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